Nicomachean Ethics
By Aristotle (350 B.C.E)
Translated by W. D. Ross
1
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit,
is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly
been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference
is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from
the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions,
it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now,
as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many;
the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that
of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall
under a single capacity- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned
with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and
every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under
yet others- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred
to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that
the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves
are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities,
as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.
2
If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire
for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this),
and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for
at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would
be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will
not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we
not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon
what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what
it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It
would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most
truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it
is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state,
and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they
should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities
to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics
uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what
we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must
include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man.
For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that
of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether
to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely
for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or
for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since
it is political science, in one sense of that term.
3
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as
the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike
in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now
fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of much
variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist
only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar
fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men
have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their
courage. We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with
such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking
about things which are only for the most part true and with premisses of
the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit,
therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark
of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so
far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish
to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a
rhetorician scientific proofs.
Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is
a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good
judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education
is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of
lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that
occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these;
and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be
vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action.
And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in
character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing
each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to
the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and
act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters
will be of great benefit.
These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected,
and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our
preface.